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INTRODUCTION
Though guaranteed by the Constitution, religious freedom in the
United States is by no means absolute. People feel pressure every day to
forego their religious practices in favor of practicality, social acceptance,
and even safety. Though outright discrimination in the workplace may be
illegal, people’s inherent attitudes and biases create significant issues and
affect law and social policy. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
religion. However, like any piece of legislation, Title VII is not without its
flaws. The source of religious discrimination itself needs to be examined
before Title VII can be amended in such a way as to actually combat that
discrimination.
Both the advantage and the fault of Title VII can be found in (1) its
vagueness and (2) its vulnerability to contemporary social issues. Like any
ambiguously worded statute, courts are faced with the problem of
interpreting Title VII. Unfortunately, the resulting interpretation often
favors employers rather than employees. The burden for an employee to
show discrimination under Title VII is exceptionally high, especially given
its vagueness.
Title VII is a living piece of legislation, expanding its original
protections against racial discrimination in 1964 to include new categories
of discrimination as society demands.1 As more types of discrimination are
1. See EEOC, Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers,
(last modified Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (discussing the various
pieces of federal legislation that protect against discrimination in the workplace, including
the Age Discrimination Act of 1967,,the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Civil Rights
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deemed unreasonable by society, legislatures have responded with
amendments to make such discrimination unlawful. Though this leaves
room for Title VII to fully expand to protect against all forms of
discrimination,2 it also leaves room for discrimination that reflects social
perceptions and biases. Social attitudes towards religion affect both
employer practices and the interpretation and implementation of the law.
Because of its vagueness, Title VII allows judges to implement the law in
ways that often reflect social sensitivities towards religion and religious
discrimination.
In modern America, there is significant religious
discrimination against perceived Muslims.3 Anti-Islamic sentiment has
swept through the country in the past decade, affecting both employer
behavior and social perception.
I.

CURRENT SCOPE OF RELIGIOUS PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES
UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”4 As established by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), the common claims for a religious discrimination
under Title VII include a failure to provide a religious accommodation,
disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and harassment.5
To bring a claim against an employer under Title VII, an individual or
his representative must first submit a claim with the EEOC within 180
calendar days of the discrimination.6 This deadline may be extended,
however, if the appropriate state or local law also prohibits discrimination

Act of 1991).
2. For instance, discrimination towards homosexuals and transgendered individuals
has attracted media attention, and it is plausible that Title VII will eventually evolve to
prohibit discrimination in that context.
3. See Steven Greenhouse, Muslims Report Rising Discrimination at Work, N.Y.
TIMES, Sep. 23, 2010, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/24muslim.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(discussing the antipathy towards Muslim workers and noting that, though Muslims account
for just two percent of the population, they make up one-quarter of all discrimination claims
filed with the EEOC).
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2013) (emphasis added).
5. See generally EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL: SECTION 12: RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION (July 22, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf
(discussing all the categories of religious discrimination and potential solutions for
employers in accommodating them).
6. See EEOC, How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/howtofile.cfm (last visited November 8, 2013) (detailing
the process for filing an employment discrimination claim).
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on the same basis.7 After investigation, the EEOC can choose to dismiss a
claim or to pursue it further.8
A. Failure to Provide a Religious Accommodation
Under Title VII, an employer must reasonably accommodate an
employee’s religious practices unless those practices would pose an undue
hardship.9 The Supreme Court has not determined any specific burdenshifting test that is applicable in all cases.10 Instead, its flexible framework
requires that the plaintiff first establish a prima facie case, and then the
burden shifts to the employer to show either that an accommodation was in
fact provided, or that doing so would pose an undue hardship.
The prima facie case for a failure to accommodate requires that an
employee: (1) “has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an
employment requirement”; (2) “informed the employer of this belief”; and
(3) “was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment
requirement.”11 Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the
employer can either show that it has provided a reasonable accommodation
or that doing so would pose an undue hardship. In Ansonia Board of
Education v. Philbrook, the Supreme Court noted that determining whether
an accommodation is reasonable is a matter of factual inquiry and
analysis.12 It can therefore be inferred that there is no steadfast guideline as
to what constitutes “reasonable” and what does not. The Supreme Court
has made it clear, however, that an employer does not have to provide an
alternate accommodation that is preferred by the employee; in fact, it does
not even need to analyze the reasonableness of such a request.13 Once a

7. Id.
8. See EEOC, Filing a Formal Complaint,
http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/filing_complaint.cfm (last visited Feb. 16,
2014) (discussing how the EEOC addresses a claim).
9. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977) (“In 1966
an EEOC guideline . . . declared that an employer had an obligation under the statute ‘to
accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of employees . . . where such
accommodation can be made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the
business.’”).
10. See Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“[W]e are mindful that the Supreme Court has declined to accept or reject any
particular . . . burden-shifting approach to Title VII religious accommodation cases.”).
11. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1986).
12. See id. at 66 (stating that “the ultimate issue of reasonable accommodation cannot
be resolved without further factual inquiry.”).
13. See id. at 68 (“Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the
employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not
further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue
hardship.”).
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reasonable accommodation is offered, the employer has met its burden
under Title VII.
Courts have established that an undue hardship is anything greater
than a de minimus burden.14 The EEOC’s guidelines state that an
accommodation may pose an undue hardship if “it is costly, compromises
workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights of
other employees, or requires other employees to do more than their share of
potentially hazardous or burdensome work.”15
B. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment is perhaps the most easily understood of the
claims under Title VII and occurs when an employer treats an employee
differently simply because of his race, color, sex, national origin, or
religion.16 A disparate treatment claim can be proved with either direct or
circumstantial evidence.17 However, it should be noted that “direct proof of
discrimination is highly uncommon.”18 In 1973, McDonnell Douglas
established a burden-shifting test for disparate impact cases using
circumstantial evidence, including claims of religious discrimination.19 In
order to prove a claim for religious disparate treatment, the employee must
first prove, by a “preponderance of the evidence,” a prima facie case of
discrimination.20
The prima facie case set forth in McDonnell Douglas is not concrete
and universal; rather, it is a foundation for a court to create a prima facie
test that is most relevant to the situation at hand.21 Accordingly, courts
have adopted the burden-shifting framework for cases of religious
discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show:

14. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 65 (stating that “more than a de minimis cost in order to
give . . . [respondent] Saturdays off [for religious purposes] is an undue hardship”).
15. EEOC, Religious Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm
(last visited November 8, 2013).
16. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977)
(discussing the use of a simple test of racially premised differences in treatment).
17. Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006).
18. Johnson v. AutoZone, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1141 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
19. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test).
20. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Urdine, 450 U.S. 248, 248 (5th Cir. 1980). See also
Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1538 (11th Cir. 1989) (requiring the employee to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence in a prima facie case of employment discrimination).
21. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (“The
prima facie case method . . . was ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.
Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.’”).
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(1) he is a member of or practices a particular religion; (2) he is
qualified to perform the job at issue; (3) he has suffered some
adverse employment action; and (4) someone outside the
protected class of which he is a member was treated differently.22
Once a prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its actions.23 Finally, the burden then shifts back to the employee to
demonstrate that the employer’s reasoning is only a pretext for
discrimination.24
C. Hostile Work Environment
A cause of action for a hostile work environment or harassment is well
established under Title VII. The rationale is that a “sufficiently abusive
harassment adversely affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of
employment within the meaning of Title VII.”25 However, the application
of that doctrine to cases of religious discrimination is a much more recent
phenomenon.26 The elements of a prima facie case and the burden of
proof, however, are the same regardless the type of discrimination
alleged.27 The violation of Title VII by means of a hostile work
environment "is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination.”28
While this might appear beneficial to employees, there are both subjective
and objective components to the hostile work environment analysis29 that
can make a successful claim difficult to achieve.
To make a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim, the
employee must show:

22. Gunning v. Runyon, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1423, 1428 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
23. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (establishing that once a prima facie case has been
made, the plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant engaged in unlawful
discrimination).
24. See id. at 717 (Blackmun, H., concurring) (explaining that the plaintiff bears the
burden of showing the employer’s reason is only pretextual) (citing Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
25. Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996).
26. See, e.g., id. (noting that hostile work environment claims have been made for
cases of sex, race, and national origin discrimination).
27. Id.
28. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
29. See Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 583 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] plaintiff
must establish not only that she subjectively perceived the environment as hostile and
abusive, but also that a reasonable person would perceive the environment to be hostile and
abusive.”).
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(1) that he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) that the
employee has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the
harassment was based on the religion of the employee; (4) that
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
terms and conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment; and (5) a basis for holding the employer
liable.30
The provisions of the prima facie case have been further defined by
courts and federal agencies. First, the EEOC notes that: “Title VII is not a
general civility code, and does not render all insensitive or offensive
comments, petty slights, and annoyances illegal. Offhand or isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not rise to the level of illegality.” 31
Therefore, there is a line drawn as to which comments will be deemed
“severe or pervasive”— “'[S]imple teasing,' offhand comments, and
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.'”32
Courts have made it clear, however, that though derogatory comments need
to be “severe or pervasive,” they do not need to tangibly affect an
employee’s ability to work in order to qualify as harassment under Title
VII.33
Even if the existence of severe or pervasive harassment has been
established, an employer may not necessarily be liable.34 Employers are
liable if a supervisor harasses in a way that tangibly affects an employee’s
working conditions (e.g. denial of promotion, lower salary, etc.).35 An
employer can attempt to use an affirmative defense to prevent liability by
proving that: “(a) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any harassing behavior, and (b) the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective

30. Rossi v. Troy State Univ., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
31. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL: SECTION 12: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 36
(July 22, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf.
32. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786, 788 (1998).
33. See, e.g., Harris 510 U.S. at 22 (“Moreover, even without regard to these tangible
effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it
created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.”). See also Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998) (“[A]n employee who refuses the
unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible
job consequences, may recover against the employer without showing the employer is
negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor’s actions . . . .”).
34. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL: SECTION 12: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 39
(July 22, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf.
35. Id. at 40.
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opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm.”36
However, there is difficulty when a co-worker is the source of the
harassment. In that case, employer liability is reduced to a negligence-like
standard,37 and an employer is liable for harassment if it “knew or should
have known about the harassment, and failed to take prompt and
appropriate corrective action.”38 With such a low standard, it is somewhat
difficult for a harassed employee to prevail.
II.

STATUTORY SHORTCOMINGS IN RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
LAW UNDER TITLE VII

A. Vagueness in Failure to Accommodate Framework
Among the Supreme Court’s first attempts at interpreting the EEOC’s
guidelines for religious protection under Title VII was Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison. The Court’s ruling, however, shed very little
light on the actual nature of what constituted an “undue hardship” and
“reasonable” religious accommodations.39 The Court found that, in light of
the vague EEOC guidelines, Trans World Airlines (TWA) had made
reasonable accommodations, and that any further accommodation would
have posed an undue hardship on the company.40 Because of the vague
nature of the EEOC guidelines, the Court was not in a position to require
any more from the employer than it had already provided. It therefore
erred on the side of caution in enforcing religious accommodation law.41
In an effort to prevent a similar situation of vagueness leading to weak
employee protection, the EEOC unsuccessfully attempted to amend Title
VII to read “severe material hardship” rather than “undue hardship.”42
Ultimately, however, the EEOC’s amended rules simply stated that there
36. Id. at 39.
37. Id. at 40. See, e.g., Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir.
2009) (discussing that an employee attempting to find his employer liable for his coworker’s harassment “must show that his employer has been negligent either in discovering
or remedying the harassment.”).
38. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL: SECTION 12: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 41
(July 22, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf. The same
“negligence” standard applies for harassment by a non-employee. Id. at 42-43.
39. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977) (“[T]he
employer’s statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for the religious
observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship, is clear, but the reach of
that obligation has never been spelled out by Congress or by EEOC guidelines.”).
40. See id. at 77 (“TWA made reasonable efforts to accommodate . . . within the
meaning of the statute as construed by the EEOC guidelines.”).
41. Id.
42. Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII Has Failed to Provide
Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV.
515, 526 (2010).
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were no set guidelines for the definition of “undue hardship” or “reasonable
accommodation,” but that factors such as the employer’s size, the number
of employees requiring accommodation, and the employer’s operating costs
were to be taken into consideration.43
The problem for most employees who face religious discrimination at
work lies not at the first step of making a prima facie case, but, rather,
combatting and employers assertion of reasonable accommodation or
undue hardship. Because the terms “reasonable accommodation” and
“undue hardship,” have never been properly defined by courts or Congress,
judges are left to apply their own reasoning—reasoning that often results in
too much deference in favor of the employer. Courts have repeatedly
attempted to create a more definite scope of “undue hardship” and
“reasonable accommodation,” but have instead exacerbated confusion.
1. The Vagueness of “Undue Hardship”
Often, failure to accommodate claims hinges on a question about
when hardship to an employer becomes “undue hardship.” Both the lower
courts and Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison faced this very question. In
that case, an airline employee who practiced the Worldwide Church of God
was unable to work during the Sabbath.44 The employee was subject to a
“seniority system” in which senior employees had priority in choosing their
shifts.45 Because the employee had recently moved to a new position, he
did not have sufficient seniority to ensure that he would not work on the
Sabbath.46 After refusing to show up for work on several Saturdays, the
employee was discharged.47 The District Court found that TWA had done
all it could to provide a reasonable accommodation without facing an
undue hardship.48 The Court of Appeals reversed and stated that TWA
ignored three potential reasonable solutions that would have
accommodated the employee’s religious needs.49 The Court of Appeals did
note some challenges that TWA would have faced in making such
accommodations, but ultimately concluded that those hardships would not
have been “undue” enough to negate TWA’s responsibility.50 The Supreme

43. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2.
44. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 63.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974) aff’d sub
nom. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 432 U.S.
63 (1977).
49. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 39-43 (8th Cir. 1975).
50. Id. at, 40 (noting that TWA could have permitted Hardison to work a four-day week
and that Hardison was willing to do this, but the company did not agree because it would
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Court overruled that decision, stating that the accommodations would have
placed an undue hardship on TWA.51 The Court reasoned that allowing an
employee to take off Saturdays to observe the Sabbath would require the
employer to bear more than a de minimus cost in replacing that employee.52
The discrepancy between the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
decisions illustrates how subjective judgments about accommodations can
be, and demonstrates how difficult it can be to distinguish between
appropriate and undue hardship. The Supreme Court itself was divided on
the issue. The dissent noted that requiring TWA to pay overtime salary to
replace Hardison during the Sabbath shift would not have been more than a
de minimus cost.53 This position seems reasonable, considering the size of
the employer and the cost of one overtime salary in the context of its full
operation.
However, the Court noted that EEOC guidelines for
determining undue hardship are unclear and that the “reach of that
obligation [to provide an accommodation short of undue hardship] has
never been spelled out by Congress or by EEOC guidelines.”54 The Court
concluded that, “[i]n the absence of clear statutory language or legislative
history to the contrary, we will not readily construe the statute to require an
employer to discriminate against some employees in order to enable others
to observe their Sabbath.”55 Because the language of the statute is unclear,
the Supreme Court has opted to err on the side of the employers in cases of
religious accommodation. This situation will continue until clearer
language is established either by Congress or by the EEOC.56
2. The Vagueness
Accommodation

in

the

“Reasonableness”

of

an

The problem of vagueness when determining what constitutes an
undue hardship resembles the difficulty in determining what constitutes a
“reasonable” accommodation. The biggest problem, however, is that a
change of position without a pay cut is considered a reasonable
accommodation, without consideration of the non-monetary effects of such
have been short-handed during one shift. Another alternative within the framework was for
TWA to fill Hardison’s Sabbath shift from other available personnel. TWA contended that
this alternative would be an undue hardship because such workers must be paid overtime
compensation. A third alternative considered was a swap between Hardison and another
employee, either for another shift or for the Sabbath days.).
51. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 75.
52. Id. at 84.
53. Id. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he costs to TWA of either paying
overtime or not replacing respondent would [not] have been more than de minimis.”).
54. Id. at 75 (majority opinion).
55. Id. at 85.
56. Id. at 84 (“To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”).

2014]

TITLE VII AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

609

an accommodation on the employee.57 A problem further arises when what
is deemed to be a “reasonable accommodation” fails to actually
accommodate the employee.
In EEOC v. Bridgestone/Firestone, two Baptist employees sought to
avoid working on Sundays, which was prohibited by their religious
beliefs.58 The employer offered the employees various accommodations,
including allowing one employee to work in the warehouse.59 Though this
change in position did not require the employee to work on Sundays, it did
involve a pay cut.60 Alternatively, the employer allowed the employee to
swap his Sunday schedule with other employees.61 Although the swaps
were permitted, there were no employees willing to take those Sunday
shifts. The result was that the affected employees were still reprimanded
for their missed Sunday shifts. The Central District of Illinois held that the
employer’s accommodations were reasonable, despite being ineffective.62
In fact, the court noted that a “reasonable accommodation” need not be an
“absolute accommodation.”63
It seems senseless to suggest that an accommodation that fails to
actually accommodate an employee can be deemed reasonable in
accordance with Title VII. Courts have consistently found that “voluntary
swaps will not always resolve a scheduling conflict, [and yet these]
programs are reasonable accommodations.”64 It is understandable that an
employer should not force other employees to change their times in order
to accommodate the religious employee. However, courts should not find
such an accommodation “reasonable,” thereby relieving an employer of his
duty under Title VII. Such precedent fails to (1) actually resolve anything
for an employee who needs an accommodation, and (2) encourage
employers to find an accommodation that is actually effective. If every
employer were allowed to simply permit time swaps without any further
accommodation or oversight, employers would be likely to view this as
their go-to response to employee complaints, all the while knowing that it
will rarely be an effective accommodation. This would allow the duty of
57. It is not the case that an employee’s position is defined only by the monetary
compensation. Factors such as type of work performed, location of work, etc., also have a
bearing on the nature of employment. See infra note 94.
58. EEOC v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
59. Id. at 928.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (stating that “Firestone was not required to provide absolute accommodation,
only a ‘reasonable accommodation.’”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
64. Moore v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 727 F. Supp. 1156, 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see also
Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Although the statutory
burden to accommodate rests with the employer, the employee has a correlative duty to
make a good faith attempt to satisfy his needs through means offered by the employer.”).
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the employer under Title VII to be effectively negated, departing from Title
VII’s intended protections.
B. Lack of Cooperation Criteria for Employers
The one-sided cooperation requirement further exacerbates the
problems caused by the vague language of Title VII. Title VII mandates
that an employee must “make some effort to cooperate with an employer’s
attempt at accommodation.”65 Such a requirement is fair; an employee
should be required to negotiate and make sure that an accommodation
poses the least hardship for an employer. However, there is no reciprocal
requirement that employers must cooperate with employees when
providing an accommodation. Furthermore, there is no clear point when an
employee’s obligation to cooperate turns into an obligation to compromise
his faith.
The legislative history of Title VII suggests the there was an intention
for an employer and employee to work together to create the most
favorable accommodation.66 However, courts have not interpreted the
language of the statute in such a way, and generally rule that an employer
has no obligation to consider an employee’s preferences when it comes to
an accommodation.67 While an employer’s obligation to provide an
accommodation can itself be seen as a compromise, the lack of a bilateral
cooperation requirement often allows an employer to forego offering an
alternative accommodation; such an alternative accommodation would not
cause much greater hardship to the employer, but would actually be much
more beneficial to an employee.

65. Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987). See also Chrysler
Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1977) (“An employee cannot shirk his duties
to try to accommodate himself or to cooperate with his employer in reaching an
accommodation by a mere recalcitrant citation of religious precepts. Nor can he thereby
shift all responsibility for accommodation to his employer. Where an employee refuses to
attempt to accommodate his own beliefs or to cooperate with his employer’s attempt to
reach a reasonable accommodation, he may render an accommodation impossible.”).
66. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986) (“Senator Randolph, the
sponsor of the amendment that became § 701(j), expressed his hope that accommodation
would be made with ‘flexibility’ and ‘a desire to achieve an adjustment.’ 118 Cong. Rec.
706 (1972). Consistent with these goals, courts have noted that bilateral cooperation is
appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s
religion and the exigencies of the employer’s business.” (internal quotation omitted)).
67. Id. (stating that “[t]his approach [of bilateral cooperation] conflicts with both the
language of the statute and the views that led to its enactment.”).
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CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

A. The Legality of “Look Policies” Under Title VII
“Look policies” are a common phenomenon, and many employers
have grooming and dressing guidelines for their employees. With the
increasing hostility towards Muslims in the last decade,68 employers have
begun considering customer preferences in mandating what their
employees should look like. Though courts have noted that an employer
cannot discriminate simply because of public preference, it often becomes
difficult to discern the employer’s actual reasoning for enforcing a look
policy. This is especially true since there is such a low burden on
employers to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
Furthermore, it seems that the reason that an employer gives does not need
to be the actual reason for its actions, just a plausible one. This gives
employers the opportunity to create discriminatory look policies based on
public expectations and preferences, and mask them behind “legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason[s].”69 Moreover, it is also troublesome that
employers often unevenly enforce their look policies,70 seemingly
punishing those that violate policy in a way that would clearly be seen as
more “offensive” to its patrons.
The Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) has one of the more elaborate
look policies, dictating everything from its employees’ hairstyles to jewelry
and underwear color.71 A look policy is understandably necessary for a
company like Disney that is trying to sell an experience to its clientele.
However, the extreme to which this policy is enforced, especially for
positions in which rigidity is not required, is astounding. Imane Boudlal, a
Muslim woman employed as a restaurant hostess at Disneyland, recently
filed a claim against Disney for a failure to accommodate.72 After

68. Omar Karmi, Islamophobia Increases Since 9/11, THE NATIONAL (Sept. 11, 2011),
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/islamophobia-increases-since-9-11 (discussing the
increasingly prevalent phenomenon of “Islamophobia”).
69. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983).
70. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Sues N.Y. Metro. Transp.
Auth. and N.Y.C. Transit Auth. Alleging Religious Discrimination (Sept. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/September/04_crt_665.htm (discussing
findings from a Department of Justice investigation that revealed that though the MTA
enforced its “no headwear” policy against Muslims and Sikhs, other workers are routinely
permitted to wear baseball caps and non-authorized headwear).
71. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Intellectual Property and Employee Selection, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 25, 30 (2013) (discussing Disney requirements that employees only have
“natural-looking and well maintained” hairstyles and that “[u]ndergarments are required, but
they must not be seen, and cannot be ‘patterned or colored’ if the employee’s costume is
light in color”) (internal citations omitted).
72. Kari Huus, Muslim Woman Sues Disney Over Wearing Hijab at Work, NBC NEWS
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naturalization, and because of her growing Muslim convictions, Boudlal
began wearing a hijab to work along with her usual required uniform. The
hijab conflicted with Disney’s look policy, and the company offered her
other approved headwear that she could wear alternatively.73 Disney also
offered her a position in the back of the restaurant, out of the sight of
customers.74
It may be understandable that Disney needs to enforce its look policy.
However, Disney’s look policy is unevenly enforced. For instance,
Boudlal also claimed that Disney officials often do not crack down on
employees whose fingernails, tattoos, and hairstyles violate the look
policy.75 Further, she alleged that Christian employees are permitted to
wear ash on their foreheads for Ash Wednesday in violation of the look
policy.76 Disney claims that the purpose of the look policy is to create a
sense of fluidity without distraction for its guests. However, one might
think that tattoos and crazy hairstyles are just as distracting as religious
headwear. And if not, then their mere inclusion in the look policy seems to
validate the point that the policy is unnecessary and obsolete. Further,
Disney caters to an international audience.77 Not only would it be a wise
business decision to promote the diversity of its employees, but what may
be considered distracting to one guest also may be de rigueur to another. A
family from Pakistan may not look twice at a restaurant hostess with a
headscarf, but would be far more distracted by a waiter with ash on his
forehead. The question then arises: how much does a violation of the look
policy actually hinder business? If the look policy is not being fully
enforced, maybe it functions more as a tradition than as a business
necessity. Finally, one might wonder why enforcement needs to be
consistent for all employees, irrespective of their role. It is understandable
that the cast member playing Prince Charming, for instance, should not be

(Aug. 13, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/13/13261567-muslim-womansues-disney-over-wearing-hijab-at-work?lite.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Muslim Ex-Employee Sues Disney, Alleging ‘Modern-Day Jim Crow’ Bias,
LOSALMITOS-SEALBEACH PATCH (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://losalamitos.patch.com/articles/muslim-former-employee-sues-disney-allegingmodern-day-jim-crow-discrimination (“Boudlal also alleged Disney has a double standard
with regard to its [look policy], noting that some employees had tattoos and wore jewelry
and hairstyles in violation of the work code.”).
76. Id. (“[Boudlal also noted that] “Christian employees were allowed to wear marks
on their foreheads on Ash Wednesday, which would technically violate the [look] policy.”).
77. See, e.g., John Couwels, Florida’s Tourism Gets A Boost From A Brazilian
Invasion, CNN, Jan. 24, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/24/travel/brazilian-touristinvasion/index.html (discussing Disney’s strategic business moves after a spike in Brazilian
tourists).
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one who wears a turban. However, this policy does not seem to be equally
necessary for non-character employees, such as restaurant hostesses.
Disney’s behavior in this situation is very much representative of the
behavior of other companies that employ “look policies.”78
The
accommodation of “Disney approved” headwear is insensitive and
ignorant. Religious headwear often has deep and meaningful religious
connotations. Such headwear cannot simply be costumized and to do so, as
Disney attempted, is insulting to the religious beliefs of the employee.
The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”) had a
similarly discriminatory look policy that employees challenged. In 2002,
the MTA began enforcing its look policy prohibiting its employees from
wearing headwear.79 Initially, four Muslim women were barred from
wearing their hijabs while operating buses, and the policy was later spread
to include Sikh men wearing turbans.80 It would have to be a great
coincidence that a policy targeting Muslims and Sikhs, who are often
associated with “terrorists” by Americans, was instituted immediately after
the September 11th attacks.81 The MTA claimed that the policy was
needed for safety reasons, so that customers could better identify MTA
personnel in the case of an emergency.82 After significant backlash, the
MTA altered its policy by allowing hijabs and turbans as long as the MTA
logo was affixed to them.83 Like the Disney officials who tried giving
Boudlal a “specially-designed hijab,” the MTA authorities acted in a way
that was insensitive to the significance of its employees’ headwear.
Further, extensive Department of Justice investigations led to the

78. See, e.g., Michael Luo, M.T.A. is Sued Over Its Policy on Muslim Head Coverings,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at B4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/01/nyregion/01turban.html?_r=0 (discussing the MTA’s
policy prohibiting employees from wearing religiously-mandated hijabs and turbans).
79. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, supra, note 70.
80. Luo, supra, note 78.
81. See History of Hate: Crimes Against Sikhs Since 9/11, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/07/history-of-hate-crimes-against-sikhssince-911_n_1751841.html (detailing the way in which Sikhs have been targeted as
“terrorists” since the 9/11 attacks, including the first post-9/11 hate crime) ; see also Susan
Donaldson James, Wisconsin Shootings: Sikhs Faced Discrimination Since 9/11, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wisconsin-shooting-hate-crimes-sikhsrise-911/story?id=16939326#.UL6g4qxpdSQ (noting that “[the Sikh Coalition] reports it
logged more than 300 such acts [of anti-terrorist hate crimes] around the country [but that]
there are likely ‘thousands more’ across the country that are never reported.”).
82. Editorial, The M.T.A. and Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/opinion/the-mta-and-fairness.html?_r=0.
83. Lauren Markoe, MTA Turban Policy: NYC Transit Allows Sikh and Muslim
Employees to Wear Turbans Without Agency Logo, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/mta-turban-sikh-muslim_n_1557558.html
(“After 9/11, the transit authority required workers wearing turbans to either perform duties
where the public would not see them, or place an ‘MTA’ logo on their headdresses . . . .”).
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conclusion that this look policy was being unevenly enforced.84 This
uneven enforcement suggested further that the policy was not actually
about safety, and this was the crux of a favorable settlement agreement for
the employees.85
Abercrombie & Fitch has perhaps the most notorious look policy, and
one that has landed it in numerous lawsuits.86 In fact, in 2005 alone, the
company shelled out $50 million in settlement payments to employees of
various protected classes.87 In 2009, the EEOC filed a disparate treatment
claim for a failure to hire for a Muslim employee who wore a hijab.88 A
similar disparate treatment claim was brought against Abercrombie & Fitch
in 2011 when it fired an employee who refused to remove her hijab and
comply with the corporate look policy.89 Abercrombie & Fitch uses this
look policy to personify their “All-American” brand image—an image that
seems disturbingly antiquated.90 It is encouraging to see, however,
(through the significant amount of litigation against Abercrombie & Fitch)
that some look policies are being held unreasonable. It seems that there is a
line to be drawn, and it is currently being drawn against the sentiment that
African Americans, Muslims, Latinos, and members of other protected
classes are not “All-American.”
The problem with look policies is two-fold: first, that such policies
often exist absent sound reasoning, and second, that social perception plays
a large role in the formation of such policies. In fact, it is likely that these
policies exist because of public image concerns. This problem is furthered
by a lack of social outrage, especially compared to the outrage over racial
and sexual discrimination.
This lack of public pressure against
discriminatory religious policies is further discussed in Part IV.C.91
B. Segregation as a Means of Accommodation
Segregation by an employer because of an employee’s religious
appearance is illegal under Title VII.92 Employers cannot intentionally
84. Huus, supra note 72.
85. Markoe, supra note 83.
86. Jerry Higgins, Abercrombie & Fitch’s “Look Policy”: Jim Crow Gets a Corporate
Makeover, IMAGINE 2050 (Jul. 8, 2010, 8:00AM),
http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2011/07/08/abercrombie-fitch%E2%80%99s%E2%80%9Clook-policy%E2%80%9D-jim-crow-gets-a-corporate-makeover/.
87. Id.
88. Press Release, EEOC, Abercrombie & Fitch Sued by EEOC for Religious
Discrimination Against Muslim Teen Applicant (Sept. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-17-09b.cfm.
89. Id.
90. Higgins, supra note 86.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 116-123.
92. EEOC, Religious Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm
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assign employees a position of non-client contact because of feared
customer preference.93 However, employers often attempt to accommodate
employees by offering them alternative positions that would resolve any
religious conflicts. There is no clear precedent as to whether a change of
position that adversely affects an employee is a reasonable accommodation;
some courts have said that it is, while others have suggested that it may not
be.94 However, what many courts fail to note is that an alternative position,
even without a change in salary or benefits, can be inherently different;
after all, salary is not the only material component of any given job. This is
especially relevant in situations where a position change can lead to what is
effectively segregation on the basis of religion.
The use of alternate positions as an accommodation is acceptable in
situations where there is no other available accommodation that would not
cause undue hardship. For instance, in EEOC v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., an employee was unable to work on Sundays due to his religious
beliefs.95 The employer offered the employee an alternative position that
involved a significant pay cut, and the court noted that it need not
determine the reasonableness of such an accommodation if all other
alternatives would pose an undue hardship.96 There was a seniority system
in place for employees to select their shifts and altering it would have been
an undue hardship under Title VII.97 An alternative position in such a
situation may be acceptable if there are no other options available in which
the integrity of the employer’s needs could be met while accommodating
the employee’s religious needs.
The cases in which this segregation is actually unacceptable are those
in which the employee’s religious appearance is at issue. Islam, Sikhism,
and Judaism—among other religions—mandate that their followers
maintain a certain appearance, ranging from grooming to headwear.
Instead of actually accommodating the headwear and grooming
requirements, employers will turn to segregation as a solution. In the case

(last visited November 8, 2013).
93. Id.
94. See U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923 (C.D. Ill.
2000) (stating that “simply because the proposed accommodation would involve some cost
to the employee does not make it unreasonable.”). But see Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214,
217 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that an inquiry into reasonableness may be necessary if the
plaintiff, “in order to accommodate his religious practices, had to accept a reduction in pay
or some other loss of benefits.”).
95. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
96. Id. at 923-24 (“Although Firestone’s accommodations resolved the religious
conflict, Frazier and Waddell had to accept a significant cut in pay. Accordingly, there is
some question as to whether the accommodations were reasonable. The court need not
resolve this issue, however, because the undisputed facts show that the only other proposed
accommodation would have imposed on Firestone an undue hardship.”).
97. Id. at 923.
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of Boudlal, for instance, Disney offered her a position in the back of the
restaurant while she wore her hijab.98 The MTA similarly offered its
turbaned and hijabi bus drivers positions in the bus depot rather than
driving the buses.99 However, these new positions were not necessarily
equal to the original ones. Aside from potential differences in growth
opportunities, type of labor performed, etc., these positions send a clear
message to religious employees: if you wear a religious garment that
conflicts with our image, not to worry, we’ll just stick you in the back.
Most employers argue that the look policy exists for some nondiscriminatory reason. Disney justifies its look policy as necessary to
create the “Disney magic” that clients pay for,100 while the MTA argues
that its look policy addresses safety concerns.101 The question arises again:
how necessary are these look policies to the functioning of the business?
For instance, some Muslim MTA bus drivers noted that they had been
wearing their headscarves for years without any safety issues.102 If
headscarves did not present a safety concern before 9/11, then arguably,
they shouldn’t after. As discussed above, Disney’s rationale for its look
policy is questionable. This leads to the assumption that an employer’s
waiver of the look policy to accommodate an employee’s religious needs
would not pose an undue hardship. Therefore, perhaps the look policy is
being enforced not for valid business concerns but as a form of segregation.
C. Federal Regulations Preventing Accommodation
Federal regulations can conflict with an employer’s ability to
accommodate employees. If an accommodation were to violate federal
regulations, granting that accommodation would be considered an undue
burden. Unfortunately, even willing employers have their hands tied unless
they knowingly ignore regulations. Though regulations do exist for a
reason, it becomes necessary in some circumstances to examine these
requirements, why they exist, and whether there is a possibility to override
them with a waiver of some kind.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), has
various regulations in place that conflict with certain religious practices.

98. Huus, supra note 72.
99. Luo, supra note 78.
100. Rowe, supra note 71 (discussing the Disney Look policy as originating due to Walt
Disney’s micromanagement and continuing today in an effort to preserve that original
corporate image).
101. The M.T.A. and Fairness, supra note 82.
102. See Luo, supra note 78 (“Even if the jobs were equivalent in pay and other
benefits, reassigning them placed an unfair stigma on them, Mr. Schwartz [the plaintiff’s
attorney] said, adding that one of the women had been wearing her head scarf while driving
a passenger bus for more than 10 years without any problem.”).
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For instance, Regulation 1910.135 requires protective headwear (e.g. hard
hats) in certain work environments.103 Many professionals, such as EMTs,
are subject to OSHA Regulation 1910.134, which states that employees
cannot have “facial hair that comes between the sealing surface of the
facepiece and the face” of a respirator mask. 104 Many city police officers
are also required to abide by a strict dress code, which generally involves
maintaining a certain facial hair length and wearing a helmet. Such
requirements pose a hardship for Sikh employees who, for instance, wear
turbans and do not cut their facial hair for religious reasons.
There have been strides to change some of these regulations in favor
of religious equality. For example, Washington D.C. recently altered its
uniform policy to allow for accommodations of Sikh police officers.105
Similar changes have been made in New York City.106 Often,
accommodating an employee by not complying with federal regulations
endangers only the employee himself, and not others. In such a case, an
employee should be given the ability to prioritize his religion over his
personal safety. However, employers will often not allow this because
such an accommodation would expose them to federal liability. Therefore,
an exception, or waiver, should be built into federal regulations to allow
employers to accommodate employees without exposing themselves to
federal or tort liability.
IV.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS IN DISCRIMINATION LAW

Law often reflects social values; this is, in fact, why provisions like
Title VII were enacted.107 Many of the problems associated with religious
discrimination law stem from a skewed perception of religious
discrimination, as well as from controversy as fundamental as to what
constitutes religion.

103. 29 C.F.R § 1910.135 (2013).
104. 29 C.F.R § 1910.134 (2013).
105. See Tara Bahrampour, D.C. Police to Allow Sikh Officers to Wear Beards,
Religious Items on the Job, WASH. POST (May 16, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-16/local/35455142_1_sikh-officers-sikhamerican-legal-defense-punjab (discussing the Washington D.C. police department’s
becoming the first major metropolitan police force to allow Sikh officers to wear religious
items while working).
106. See NYPD Turban Ban Will Be Challenged By New Bill, Sikh Coalition,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/18/nypdturban-ban-will-be-c_n_930368.html (looking at the legislative challenges to the New York
Police Department’s ban on Sikh headwear).
107. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431 (1966)
(discussing the enactment of Title VII in the wake of the Civil Rights Act and a need for
greater racial equality).
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A. Immutability
The way that society views religion and religious discrimination has a
direct impact on religious discrimination law. The other Title VII protected
classes—race, color, sex, and national origin—are immutable
characteristics in that they are not chosen, but rather “born into.”108
Religion, on the other hand, lies in a murky, gray area, seen by some as
voluntary and by others as compelled.109 After all, you can technically shed
yourself of religious faith (or choose a different religion) in a way in which
you cannot choose to shed your Indian skin or choose to become EastAsian or Brazilian.
Courts have repeatedly discussed the relationship between immutable
characteristics and protection as suspect classes under Title VII.110
Naturally, this leads people to wonder if something that is a choice should
actually be protected under Title VII. Such thinking is also representative
of the way in which employers treat the religious needs of its employees, as
well as the way society views religious discrimination overall. Employers
often think that it is not as serious of a concern because it can be
compromised, and the public often thinks that religious discrimination is
not as serious as racial or sexual discrimination because either they (1) do
not share those same religious sentiments or (2) think that religion is a
choice.
B. Social Perception of Religion and its Effects on Employer Policies
Though employers are becoming more conscious of their employees’
religious needs, it is a very common perception that religion is chosen and
can be compromised for employment. This is exacerbated by the fact that,
even within a single faith, followers vary in practice. This leads to both
employer policies and statutes assuming that assume believers can make
religious compromises.
108. Blair, supra note 42, at 547.
109. Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 359 (1997)
(“[R]eligion just feels different from the other categories in that it seems both compelled and
voluntary and that it is largely about observance.”).
110. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that close relatives
are not a suspect class because, “[a]s a historical matter, they have not been subjected to
discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that
define them as a discrete group.”). See also Dean v. D.C., 653 A.2d 307, 330 (D.C. 1995)
(discussing constitutional rights by determining “the extent to which sexual orientation is
immutable.”). See also Jacobson v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 646 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) aff’d, 664 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 1996) (holding that parents of children, ages, 18-21 who
live at home, do not “constitute a suspect class” using the immutable characteristic argument
laid in Lyng v. Castillo).
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This article is not suggesting that employers should completely
compromise their business practices in order to accommodate their
religious employees. After all, operations need to be streamlined in order
for business to properly function. However, the burden imposed by
religious accommodation under Title VII on employers is set so low that
the burden of compromise falls mainly on the employee. Furthermore,
because Title VII only mandates that employers provide one reasonable
accommodation and need not consider an employee’s reasonable
alternatives,111 employers can simply take the “easy way out.” Though an
alternative accommodation could be exponentially better for an employee
and would not be unreasonably burdensome to the employer, the employer
technically does not need to entertain the idea.
The connection between an employer’s perception of religion as
disposable and the lack of accommodation in corporate look policies is
clear. As seen with the Disney and MTA employees, employers will try to
change their employee’s religious appearance, or “accommodate” it in
ways that forces the employee to compromise his religious beliefs.112
Furthermore, employers are increasingly conscious of their brand image
and the way that their employees’ appearance affects business.113 An
unshorn beard, for instance, may seem unkempt to some customers, but has
significant religious meaning to a Sikh man. If a company wants to portray
a polished look, they may require that all male employees be clean-shaven.
The controversy surrounding the immutability of religion is furthered
by varying degrees of practice even within one religion. These degrees do
not exist when it comes to race, sex, or national origin; this leads to
difficulty for employers in easily identifying employees as members of a
certain religion, understanding what an employee’s religious practices may
be, and what the employee can and cannot compromise as a part of their
religious faith. Religion itself is defined and understood in various ways.
In fact, many religions are separated into classifications dependent on the
level of adherence or practice.114 For instance, it is controversial among
111. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 61 (1986) (holding that
employers meet legal obligations upon offering a reasonable accommodation to their
employees and that they do not need to also show that each proposed alternative
accommodation would result in undue hardship).
112. See Markoe, supra note 83 (detailing how MTA workers were asked to affix the
MTA logo to their headwear, demeaning the significance of each employee’s headwear to
their religious practices). See also Huus, supra note 72 (describing how a Muslim Disney
employee was asked to wear headdresses that were specifically designed to match the theme
of the restaurant in which she worked).
113. See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1483 (2011) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680512
(discussing that employers discriminate on the basis on appearance, and the inequities
associated with obesity).
114. See,
e.g.,
Intermarriage
Q&A,
JEWISH
OUTREACH
INSTITUTE,
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Muslims whether the hijab is a required garment.115 Hence, some Muslim
women choose to wear it as a part of their faith while others do not. This
can understandably cause confusion among employers, who may have one
Muslim employee who willingly forgoes her hijab and another who refuses
to do so. This may also further the perception in employers’ minds that
religious elements can be compromised: “If she can take off her hijab and
abide by our look policy, why can’t you?”
C. Social Views of Religious Discrimination Post 9/11
Discrimination is cyclical and anti-discrimination laws progress and
evolve as social concepts of “suspect classes” change. For instance, Title
VII “prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, national
origin, sex, or religion.”116 Title VII was originally created as a part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which originated with the civil rights movement
and had the purpose of combatting racial discrimination.117 Similarly, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act were not adopted until social norms necessitated them, in 1967 and
1978, respectively.118 Even the types of discrimination that federal law is
used to combat show a distinct progression.119 The clear flow of litigation
under Title VII is fairly representative of social issues and the types of
discrimination that are most prevalent at different times historically.
Currently, one of the most widespread discriminatory sentiments is
the anti-Islamic sentiment that swept the nation after the 9/11 attacks.
Domestic terrorism is a concept that once may have been considered absurd
and oxymoronic, but it has become increasingly prevalent in the past few
decades.120 This anti-Islamic sentiment affects not only Muslims, but also
http://www.joi.org/qa/denom.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (discussing the various
branches of Judaism as Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist).
115. See, e.g., John Blake, Muslim Women Uncover Myths About the Hijab, CNN NEWS
(Aug. 12, 2012, 7:54 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/08/12/generation.islam.hijab/index.html (discussing the
significance of the hijab to Muslim women and noting that “[t]he Quran is very ambiguous
about whether you have to wear the veil or not.”).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 (2013).
117. EEOC, Pre-1965: Events Leading to the Creation of EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/pre1965/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
118. EEOC, Timeline of Important EEOC Events,
http://www.eeoc.gov/youth/history.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
119. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (showing one of the first
cases fought under Title VII and discussing race discrimination in the workplace); Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (1984) (showing one of the first cases fighting gender
discrimination under Title VII—twenty years after Title VII was enacted); Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (discussing same-sex sexual
harassment).
120. See, e.g., The Benefits of Hindsight: The Need for More Monitoring of Domestic
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Sikhs, who are often perceived by many to be Muslim.121 Just like bias in
regards to race, gender, and sexual orientation, religious discrimination
need not be obvious or conscious to have an effect on preferences and
actions.122 Therefore, anti-Islamic sentiment following 9/11 can have a
potentially significant impact on consumer preferences—even the
preferences of those individuals who do not consider themselves racist.
This affects employers’ decisions in two ways: first, employers who
harbor these innate biases themselves manifest them in their look and other
employment policies, and, second, employers recognize the power of
subconscious discrimination and know that customers may prefer buying a
car, clothes, or accounting services from someone who does not look
foreign. And though outright discrimination is not legal, there are ways in
which employers can cover their discriminatory policies with some
arbitrary non-discriminatory business interest. This, coupled with the low
burden of proof for employers in the various discrimination claims, leads to
practices that discriminate against minority employees.
This anti-Islamic sentiment also leads to a lack of contempt for
religious discrimination, especially in comparison to racial or gender
Terrorism, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21560566
(discussing the extreme political implications of anti-Islamic sentiment and violence). See
also Ben Jacobs, ‘Domestic Terrorism’ Kills Six in Oak Creek Sikh Temple, THE DAILY
BEAST (Aug. 5, 2012, 9:46 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/05/domestic-terrorism-kills-six-in-oakcreek-sikh-temple.html (discussing the tragic shooting at a Sikh “gudwara” as an act of
domestic terrorism); Stan Wilson, Producer of Anti-Islam Film Arrested, Ordered Held
Without Bail, CNN NEWS (Sept. 28, 2012, 10:48 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/27/world/california-anti-islam-filmmaker/index.html
(discussing a highly controversial anti-Muslim film that sparked riots all over the world).
121. See, e.g., Paul Raushenbush, The Difference Between Muslims and Sikhs.. Misses
the Point, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2012, 12:30 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-raushenbush/difference-between-muslims-and-sikhsmisses-the-point_b_1747311.html (discussing, in the aftermath of the Oak Creek shooting,
the way in which Sikhs are often mistaken for Muslims). See also Dinesh Ramde & Todd
Richmond, Wisconsin Temple Shooting: Oak Creek Incident Leaves at Least 7 Dead,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2012, 11:01 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/05/wisconsin-temple-shooting-sikh-oakcreek_n_1744761.html (“Sikh rights groups have reported a rise in bias attacks since the
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The Washington-based Sikh Coalition has reported more than 700
incidents in the U.S. since 9/11, which advocates blame on anti-Islamic sentiment. Sikhs
are not Muslims, but their long beards and turbans often cause them to be mistaken for
Muslims . . . .”).
122. See, e.g., Jeff Stone, Racist, Prejudiced Attitudes Seep From Our Subconscious,
ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Aug. 6, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://azstarnet.com/news/opinion/racistprejudiced-attitudes-seep-from-our-subconscious/article_dd243e21-c99a-55af-851bba004f549c91.html (discussing the subconscious nature of racial discrimination and that
“[s]ubconscious biases creep into our responses so quietly that most people do not know
when or how to prevent them. Explicitly rejecting racism . . . does not turn off the
automatic biases that lurk in our subconscious.”).
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discrimination. If an employer were to openly discriminate against an
employee for his race or sex, it is likely that more people would be
outraged than if the same employer discriminated against the employee for
his religious beliefs. There is even likely to be far greater outrage for an
employer that does not make his office accessible to the disabled than for
one who does not accommodate his employee’s religious practices.123 This
happens for three primary reasons. The first goes back to the nature of
religion and the controversy of immutability. People look at a religious
employee and wonder why the employee does not just set aside her beliefs
if her job is more important?” Second, more people can associate
themselves with gender classifications or racial classifications than
religious ones. Finally, as a society we have been conditioned to find
certain kinds of discrimination more unacceptable and often tend to
sympathize with the victim—for example, discrimination against the
disabled. The recent stigma against certain religious practices—and the
way that society can view religion in general—creates a lack of sympathy
for those facing religious persecution.
V.

A DYNAMIC AND EFFICIENT APPROACH TO THE FUTURE OF
RELIGIOUS PROTECTION

Like most legislation, Title VII is not static in its interpretation and
application. Just as there have been recent rulings regarding Title VII
protection for sexual orientation,124 the variation in claims arising under the
statute will continue to change going forward. As noted earlier, protection
under Title VII is often representative of social norms and perceptions; as
social views evolve, so does the law.
A. Potential Backlash to Stricter Protection of Religious Rights
The potential for backlash with the adoption of stricter religious
protection under Title VII is significant. Rulings under the current law
show that employers already have a low threshold for the burden they are
willing to bear when accommodating employees.125 Further, there are other

123. See Blair, supra note 42, at 515 (“[I]magine that your employer does not provide a
ramp or some other accommodation for you to enter the building. You and most of society
would find that unreasonable and, indeed, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
would probably mandate that you be accommodated.”).
124. See EEOC, Facts about Discrimination in Federal Government Employment Based
on Marital Status, Political Affiliation, Status as a Parent, Sexual Orientation, or
Transgender (Gender Identity) Status, http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/otherprotections.cfm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (detailing EEOC rulings based on sexual orientation).
125. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 63 (1977) (showing
a case where the threshold tolerance was very low).
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potential concerns regarding employers’ rights and the exploitation of a
more accommodating Title VII. However, with the adoption of the right
kind of framework, it is possible to negate these concerns.
1. Balancing Employers’ Rights with Religious Rights
At some point, the need to protect an employee’s religious rights may
overshadow the employer’s right to conduct business efficiently and in the
manner he chooses. This is, after all, the crux of the “undue hardship”
issue.
As discussed earlier, this becomes an issue with look policies and
employers’ rights to choose the way their employees present themselves.
As in the cases discussed earlier, employers often claim that their look
policies are necessary to protect the integrity of their businesses.126 For
instance, Hooters is a popular restaurant chain with a well-known waitress
uniform policy—one that dictates not only the exact clothing to be worn,
but also the waitress’s hair and makeup.127 Hooters restaurants sell a very
specific atmosphere, and the look policy is essential to that.128 It is
expected that a restaurant like Hooters would take issue with a more
accommodating Title VII that negated its ability to dictate employee dress.
It is plausible that certain employers would find a similar necessity to avoid
providing religious accommodations for their look policies.
What needs to be noted, however, is that not all businesses are alike
and not all look policies are alike. Title VII’s “failure to accommodate”
framework should not be seen as black and white, but should rather be
approached in an effort to balance the employer’s rights with the
employee’s rights. If courts correctly apply such a balancing approach,
they should be better able to distinguish situations in which the look policy
is necessary from those that it is not. However, a problem also lies with the
low standard of the “undue hardship” for an accommodation. Such a
burden is negligible for most employers and leaves many employees
without effective accommodations. Instead, the language of Title VII
should adopt the phrase “substantial hardship” or something of that nature.
Alternatively, the statute should properly define “undue hardship”.129

126. See, e.g., The M.T.A. and Fairness, supra note 82 (discussing how a company felt
not wearing a turban was integral to maintaining authority).
127. See Diane Bullock, What it Takes to Work Here: Hooters, MINYANVILLE (Jun. 15,
2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.minyanville.com/special-features/articles/hooters-restauranthooters-training-work-at/6/15/2010/id/28534 (noting that the Hooters dress policy requires
that hair is styled “using the ‘best, not the cheapest’ products and . . . must be cut every six
to eight weeks. No ponytails and for god’s sake ‘NEVER come to work with wet hair!’”).
128. Id. (detailing more of Hooter’s image requirements).
129. For an example of a different formulation of a heightened standard, see Sadia
Aslam, Hijab in the Workplace: Why Title VII does not Adequately Protect Employees from
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Placing a higher burden on employers would strengthen the requirement
that look policies be deemed actually necessary to business operations. In
such a situation, an employer who has a genuine fiscal or business concern
will not be affected by the higher standard of burden. If it were the case
that an employer would be substantially burdened by accommodating a
religious practice, they would preserve the right to maintain their look
policy. Meanwhile, employers that would not actually be affected would
be required to accommodate their employees’ religious beliefs and
practices.
Objectors to this approach might argue that if the burden for
employers to provide accommodations is heightened, the kinds of
accommodation that employers are required to make will continue to
progress to the point of absurdity. These objectors might point to the
kirpan, a Sikh article of faith often resembling a small sword, which is
often the subject of controversy in religious discrimination disputes.130
Many employers might worry that if a greater range of religious
accommodations is mandated, then at some point they will lose control
over significant issues, such as safety, in their offices.
Once
accommodations are made for religious attire and grooming,
accommodations for articles of faith like kirpans may soon be required too.
However, employers need not worry about losing complete authority
to the point that workplace safety is jeopardized. Even if Title VII is
amended and creates a “substantial hardship” requirement as suggested
above, employers would still be able to prohibit items like a kirpan. The
beauty of a balancing approach requiring a substantial hardship is that an
employer’s rights would still be maintained to the degree that they are
legitimate and necessary. There is no question that safety is a real concern
for employers, and a properly laid out balancing test would account for
this.
Congress and the courts agree that employers should not have to
compromise the integrity of their business practices in an effort to
accommodate employees. However, the way the current law stands, this
balance of interests is applied in an inequitable manner, favoring employers
at the expense of employees. As noted above, amending the burden
requirement in the failure to accommodate framework would help resolve

Discrimination on the Basis of Religious Dress and Appearance, 80 UMKC L. Rev. 221,
236 (2011) (proposing a standard of “significant difficulty or expense”).
130. See Frank Taylor, Interpretation of Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Issue in
IRS Employee’s Lawsuit Over Kirpan, EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://www.examiner.com/article/interpretation-of-religious-freedom-restoration-act-isissue-irs-employee-s-lawsuit-over-kirpan (discussing a recent case in which a Sikh IRS
employee was prohibited from bringing her kirpan to the federal building in which she
worked).
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this imbalance. Undue hardship is an exceptionally minimal requirement131
and by raising the burden on the employer, more employees can plausibly
be accommodated with a negligible effect on the employer.
Another important aspect of this balancing approach is Title VII’s
cooperation requirement, interpreted by courts such that an employer’s
“efforts to reach reasonable accommodation [triggers an employee’s] duty
to cooperate.”132 Nowhere does it require any such cooperation from the
employer’s side, as it is likely presumed that the employer’s effort to
provide accommodation itself is cooperation. However, this one-sided
requirement perpetuates this imbalance. It is plausible that providing an
employee with an accommodation that he prefers would be no more
burdensome to the employer. But the employer does not have to even
entertain the idea; once he has offered one “reasonable” accommodation,
he has met his responsibility. By creating a dual-cooperation requirement,
an employee may be able to receive a fairer accommodation and leave the
employer no worse off. This cooperation can be tailored in such a way as
not to create an extra burden for the employer (e.g., having to cooperate by
providing a more burdensome accommodation) and simply creates a better
situation for the employee if all else is equal.
2. Employers’ Avoidance of Liability from Backlash
Discrimination Claims
There is already concern under existing law of the prevalence of
“backlash discrimination claims,” and employers’ exposure to liability.133
It is plausible that such concerns would only be exacerbated if the burden
placed on employers to provide accommodation increased. The numbers
don’t lie: there has been a leap in the number of claims since the 9/11

131. See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 63 (finding no violation of civil rights laws where
an employer had tried in a variety of ways to accommodate an employee whose religious
beliefs prohibited him from working on Saturdays).
132. Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., 22 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1994). See, e.g., Smith v.
Pyro Min. Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987) (affirming a district court order
awarding plaintiff employee damages for discrimination on the basis of religion in violation
of Title VII because plaintiff established a prima facie case, defendant employer’s
accommodations were not reasonable, and defendant did not show that it would suffer an
undue hardship). See also Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding
that an employer did not violate Title VII by failing to accommodate the employee’s
religious beliefs where the employee flouted company policy, ignored readily available
means of accommodation, and maintained an intransigent position).
133. Cassandra M. Gandara, Note, Post-9/11 Backlash Discrimination in the
Workplace: Employers Beware of Potential Double Recovery, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 169,
169-70, 182 (2006) (seeking to “inform and forewarn employers of a few of the potential
causes of action that could be filed against them based on post-9/11 backlash discrimination
and the potential extent of their liability for such discrimination.”).
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terrorist attacks, from 2127 in 2001 to 4151 in 2011.134 Cassandra M.
Gandara notes that these numbers leave employers too susceptible to
litigious claims.135 But she alleges that the de minimus standard in Title VII
“provid[es] a viable defense against any backlash religious discrimination
claim.”136 She also suggests ways in which employers can take formal
steps to defend against the “potentially devastating blow[s] to [their]
business[] finances [that would be experienced by having to] pay hundreds
of thousands of dollars to one or more employees.”137 Gandara, and others
like her, would likely believe that creating a higher standard of proof would
make employers unfairly vulnerable to overly litigious employees.
This argument is flawed in two primary ways. First, it focuses on the
cause of the discrimination rather than its effect on the employment
conditions. It is true that the increase in religious discrimination in recent
years is the result of backlash and anti-terrorist sentiment.138 However, an
employer’s first thought in response to this increased discrimination should
not be avoiding liability, but rather creating a less discriminatory work
environment. Employers overlook the actual issue by focusing on avoiding
liability and the intent and source of discrimination.
Second, the argument fails to account for the high percentage of
claims that are dissuaded at the agency level itself, thereby preventing the
employer from facing claims with no merit. Because all Title VII claims
must be filed with the EEOC, the agency can choose to proceed with only
those that have some reasonable basis.139 For instance, of the 4151
religious discrimination claims filed with the EEOC in 2011, only 303 were
found to have reasonable cause.140 It is evident that these claims are
thoroughly screened in order to prevent unreasonable liability and litigation
for employers. As for these remaining 303 claims, employers should
address the source of discrimination within their workplace and seek to
quash the actual discrimination rather than just the liability.

134. EEOC,
Religion
Based
Charges
FY
1997
–
FY
2012,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
135. Gandara, supra note 133.
136. Id. at 179.
137. Id. at 200.
138. Confronting Discrimination in the Post 9/11 Era: Challenges and Opportunities
Ten Years Later, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/publications/post911/post911summit_report_2012-04.pdf
(discussing the spike in hate crimes and discrimination in the backlash of 9/11).
139. EEOC, Filing a Charge of Discrimination,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
140. EEOC, Religion-Based Charges FY 1997 – FY 2012,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
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B. The Ineffectiveness of Legislation Absent a Change in Social
Perceptions
The progress made over the past few decades in protecting religious
rights in the workplace is laudable; the amendments made to Title VII and
related laws effectively protect many employees from discrimination.
However, change is not swift enough to keep pace with the rising levels of
discrimination and particularly sticky nuances of Title VII. A law like Title
VII must be a living document—it needs to evolve to adopt the
contemporary issues that Americans face. Religious discrimination in post9/11 America is a significant issue and the law should evolve to address it.
At the same time, such a law needs to survive the biases and backlash that
it encounters. After all, progress requires facing inevitable opposition.
However, even progressive religious discrimination laws are often
ineffective if social mentality itself does not evolve. As one legislative
advocate notes:
Even as Sikhs and other religious minorities celebrate [legislation
protecting religious dress], bigots regard it as an abomination.
They balk at the specter of turbaned Sikh police officers
protecting their communities. They recoil at the thought of
Muslim women selling them clothes while wearing headscarves.
And they look askance at Jews and Adventists for observing a
Sabbath on a day other than Sunday . . . . [N]aysayers worry that
[this legislation] gives a blank check to religious observers to
wear and do whatever they want.141
Laws and society have a somewhat interconnected relationship; the
nature of the law affects social perceptions and social perceptions also
affect the law. It is much harder to change social views on race and
religion than it is to create progressive laws that will pave the way for
social acceptance. Fortunately, there have been efforts in creating more
equitable employment discrimination laws. The Workplace Religious
Freedom Act of 2010 was introduced as amendment to Title VII and
proposed stricter requirements for employers in providing religious
accommodations.142 Among other amendments, this bill defined “undue
hardship” as “impos[ing] a significant difficulty or expense on the conduct
of the employer's business when considered in light of relevant factors”
and stated that an accommodation “shall not be considered to be a
reasonable accommodation if the accommodation requires segregation of

141. Rajdeep Singh, Celebrating AB1964, California’s New Religious Freedom Law,
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/guestvoices/post/celebrating-ab1964-californias-new-religious-freedomlaw/2012/09/18/ad7d07fc-01e1-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_blog.html.
142. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010).
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an employee from customers or the general public.”143 Though it has no
co-sponsors, the bill was reintroduced in 2012.144
Some state legislation has been able to address these social nuances in
a way that Title VII hasn’t yet. In fact, many state regulations have more
stringent anti-discrimination requirements for employers that not only
provide greater protection for employees, but also battle those issues found
in federal law. For instance, in the wake of the Oak Creek Sikh Shooting,
California passed the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (“AB1964”),
amending the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. This law
places even stricter requirements on employers when accommodating an
employee’s religious practices. The law is said to “eliminate[] confusion
between the federal and state definitions of undue hardship stating that
California has a higher significant difficulty or expense hurdle for religious
accommodation instead of the de minimus standard.”145
The system is not flawless. Though there is progress towards more
perfect legislation at both a state and federal level, there are deeper social
issues around religion and religious discrimination. People who have the
hateful sentiments like those described above infiltrate the workplace, the
legislature, and the courts. Until society as a whole can look at religion in
an unbiased way, Title VII will never be able to reach its full and greatest
potential.
CONCLUSION
Title VII has three primary flaws. First, the ambiguity of the statute
itself, leaving it vulnerable to improper interpretation. Second, the way in
which that flawed statutory framework allows for inefficient and improper
accommodation, ranging from workplace segregation to ill-enforced look
policies. Finally, the social vulnerability of the legislation and way in
which it fails to keep up with social norms, and yet, is susceptible to
contemporary social biases.
It is possible to amend Title VII to make it more dynamic and efficient
in dealing with claims of religious discrimination. If the requirement for an
employer to evade providing accommodation remains “undue hardship,”
this term needs to be explicitly clarified in the way that California’s
Workplace Discrimination Act has done so.
Further, “reasonable
accommodation” needs to be defined more precisely, taking into account
that segregation and alteration of religious practices may not be seen as

143. Id. at § 4(a)(3).
144. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012).
145. Beth Zoller, New California Laws Address Religious Discrimination,
Accommodation and Tolerance, JDSUPRA (Sep. 13, 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-california-laws-address-religious-di-49933/.
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reasonable. With these clarifications, there is less of a burden on courts to
interpret the statute—interpretation that more often than not results in favor
of the employer. This clarification would also help resolve many of the
issues with look policies and discerning which policies are necessary for
business and which can be amended or are simply pretexts for
discrimination.
In the end, any evolution in Title VII should aim to strike a balance
between religious rights and the rights of employers to conduct business
efficiently and cost effectively. By creating the appropriate balancing test,
and assuming proper execution by the courts, Title VII can create greater
religious freedom without becoming overly burdensome to employers.

